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INTRODUCTION 
We got a nice respectable business now, money coming in regular and—
since we’re careful to pick and choose—only strangers and such like wot 
won’t be missed—who’s going to catch on? 
 
— Sweeney Todd, the Demon Barber of Fleet Street 
 
In 2011, The New York Times published an interview with West End and 
Broadway producer Sonia Friedman (The Book of Mormon, Harry Potter and the 
Cursed Child, Dreamgirls) commenting on the “staggeringly” high cost of 
producing Broadway shows.1  Whereas in the mid-1980s, it cost approximately five 
million dollars to produce a Broadway musical and seven hundred thousand dollars 
to produce a Broadway play,2 by 2011, those average costs were reported to be 
approximately ten million dollars and two-and-one-half million dollars 
respectively.3 
To incentivize investors to bankroll Broadway shows, productions now give 
above-the-title producer credit (as defined in Section I) to individuals solely for 
raising or contributing a portion of the show’s capitalization.  The New York Times 
describes this practice: 
When Elizabeth Taylor announced “42nd Street” as the best musical Tony winner in 
1981, only one producer walked to the stage:  David Merrick, a giant in the business.  
He had investors, sure—but back then they were content to be anonymous, fancying 
themselves as angels who performed little financial miracles (i.e., writing checks) to 
get shows on.  But even in 1981, multiple producers were starting to appear above the 
title, to Ms. Taylor’s chagrin as she kept flubbing their names.  Bottom line:  Musicals 
cost much less in Merrick’s era—$1 million or $2 million, compared with $10 million 
to $15 million now—so a few big checks or a small pool of steady investors did the 
trick. . . .  [T]oday, anonymity won’t do.  In exchange for their money, investors want 
a say (they’re invited to marketing meetings), love the limelight (free opening-night 
tickets) and otherwise expect to be treated like producers.4 
Take, for example, the 2014 Tony Award-winning Best Musical, A Gentleman’s 
Guide to Love and Murder.  The show was an “unlikely hit”—it was written in the 
style of British operetta, and it boasted neither big-name Hollywood stars nor a 
recognizable underlying brand.5  During previews (public performances before a 
show’s official opening), lead producer Joey Parnes was still short one-third of the 
seven-and-one-half million-dollar capitalization, which he had to raise by opening 
 
 1. Patrick Healy, The Staggering Cost of Broadway, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011, 11:15 AM), 
https://perma.cc/XK7F-SUXJ. 
 2. MARTIN BANHAM, THE CAMBRIDGE GUIDE TO THEATRE 1150 (1995).  
 3. Ken Davenport, What’s the Average Cost of Putting on a Broadway Show?, THE PRODUCER’S 
PERSPECTIVE (June 7, 2012), https://perma.cc/QTM4-UKW5. 
 4. Patrick Healy, I Want to Be a Producer (Me Too!), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2014, at AR1. 
 5. Michael Paulson, ‘Gentleman’s Guide’ Kills It in Final Week on Broadway, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
19, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/9CTJ-ZV8T. 
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night.6  To close his fundraising gap, Mr. Parnes offered above-the-title producer 
credit to individuals for investing or bundling small units of the remaining 
capitalization.  Louise H. Beard, a sixty-four-year-old former tap dance teacher, 
received above-the-title producer credit for investing thirty-five thousand dollars in 
the show, as did Larry Hirschhorn,7 a former actor, for forming a syndicate of 
investors who put in a total of two hundred thousand dollars.8  Ultimately, 
Gentleman’s Guide gave billing to forty-four above-the-title producers.9 
This practice is often celebrated for helping deserving shows that would 
otherwise never be produced make it to the Broadway stage.10  Still, the practice is 
not without its critics.  Some industry leaders worry that this proliferation of billed 
producers will diminish the work that lead producers do.  More importantly, others 
fear that co-producers, if left unregulated, will fail to abide by the laws that govern 
fundraising activity.11 
This Note will analyze industry concerns relating to the practice of granting 
above-the-title producer credit to individuals solely for contributing or bundling a 
share of a production’s capitalization, specifically by asking whether money-
bundling Broadway co-producers are acting as unregistered broker-dealers in 
violation of applicable Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”) registration 
requirements.  In Section I of this Note, I provide a history of Broadway producing 
models, so as to understand how today’s dominant model developed.  In Section II, 
I unpack that model by describing the structure of theatrical investment vehicles 
and identifying the different types of Broadway producers.  In Sections III and IV, I 
outline the applicable provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities 
Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), and in 
Section V, I apply the SEC’s four-factor “broker-dealer” test to the conduct of 
money-bundling Broadway co-producers, thereby isolating industry practices that 
might trigger registration requirements.  Finally, in Sections VI through VII, I 
identify the potential consequences of using unregistered brokers and develop a list 
of recommendations that production companies can follow to avoid violating SEC 
registration requirements. 
I. A HISTORY OF BROADWAY PRODUCING MODELS 
The history of “Broadway” as we know it—a district with over forty 
professional theaters running from 42nd to 53rd Street in midtown Manhattan—
owes much to the Shubert family, and I begin my narrative history with them.  
Sam, Lee, and Jacob Shubert, three brothers from Syracuse, New York, launched 
their theatre empire in the late nineteenth century, when they acquired four theaters 
 
 6. Healy, supra note 4. 
 7. Larry Hirschorn received billing as his syndicate, Cricket-CTM Media/Mano-Horn 
Productions.  
 8. Healy, supra note 4.   
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Interview with David Stone, Broadway Producer, in N.Y., N.Y. (Aug. 10, 2016).  
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in upstate New York.12  In 1905, the Shuberts signed a three-year lease on the 
Herald Square Theatre in Manhattan’s Garment District, thereby expanding into 
New York City.13  Over the next twenty years, the Shuberts purchased or 
constructed over eighty additional theaters throughout the United States, including 
Broadway’s Ambassador, Booth, Broadway, Schoenfeld, Longacre, Shubert, and 
Winter Garden Theatres.14 
Under the auspices of the Shubert Theatrical Company, a publicly traded 
corporation, the Shuberts actively produced shows—usually operettas and revues—
to fill their many theatres.15  Often, the Shuberts created a production for a New 
York theatre that they then would duplicate across the United States and Canada.  
This practice continued until the Stock Market Crash of 1929, the effects of which 
eventually forced the company to place its assets in receivership under the Irving 
Trust Company, which held the theaters for two years in close consultation with 
Lee Shubert.16  In 1933, Lee purchased the theaters back from the bank for four 
hundred thousand dollars.17  At this point, however, the Shuberts withdrew from 
producing and focused their efforts on theater proprietorship.18  The Shubert 
Organization still invests in many shows—this season alone, it is listed as a co-
producer of The Band’s Visit, Meteor Shower, Escape to Margaritaville, and 
Angels in America—but, except on rare occasions, the organization no longer 
“suppl[ies] their own product” like it did in the 1920s.19 
The Shubert’s retreat from lead producing opened the door for independent 
producers to enter the Broadway landscape.  Emblematic of the independent 
producer model, David Merrick is often considered “the most prolific [producer] in 
Broadway history.”20  A trained lawyer, Merrick made his lead producing debut 
with the musical Fanny, which ran for 888 performances between 1954 and 1956 in 
two different Shubert theaters.21  Throughout his career, Merrick produced over 
eighty musicals and plays—including the original productions of 42nd Street, Gypsy 
and Hello Dolly!—and won eleven Tony awards.22  Most impressive was Merrick’s 
skill for “weighing the use of his own money versus that of investors.”23  When 
Merrick was “certain of a show’s success, as was the case with 42nd Street,” he 
 
 12. Anthony Vickery, Did the Shuberts Save Broadway? The Corporate Producers, in THE 
PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF MUSICAL THEATRE PRODUCERS 69, 71 (Laura MacDonald & William A. 
Everett eds., 2017).  
 13. Id. 
 14. NATHAN HURWITZ, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MUSICAL THEATRE: NO BUSINESS LIKE IT 
60 (2014); Theatres, THE SHUBERT ORGANIZATION, https://perma.cc/9S3J-SX3R. 
 15. Vickery, supra note 12, at 74.  
 16. Id., at 78; MICHAEL RIEDEL, RAZZLE DAZZLE 33 (2015).  
 17. Vickery, supra note 12, at 78.  
 18. RIEDEL, supra note 16, at 34.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Ryan McKinney, ‘He Cold Get It for You Wholesale’:  The Producing Genius of David 
Merrick, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF MUSICAL THEATRE PRODUCERS, supra note 12, at 217, 219. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Michael Phillips, David Merrick, Legendary Broadway Producer, Dies, L.A. TIMES, April 27, 
2000, https://perma.cc/Z3U8-Q553.  
 23. McKinney, supra note 20, at 222.  
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invested only his own money.24  With riskier projects, however, Merrick relied 
primarily on outside investments. 
To minimize accounting expenses and organizational difficulties, Merrick and 
his contemporaries often sought investments from only a small number of wealthy 
individuals.25  Sometimes, producers would accept investments from “investor 
groups”—similar to the investment syndicate described in the Introduction—that 
would act through a “nominee” who served as the limited partner of record and 
distributed financial statements and payments received from the producer to the 
other investors.26  And in the early 1960s, some producers turned to investment 
companies that employed registered brokers to pool investment funds into 
diversified portfolios of theatrical productions.27  Whatever the model used, 
however, producers rarely billed investors or invited them to participate in the 
management of the production entity.28 
Eventually, the independent producer model became unsustainable.  Most 
significantly, the fortification of theatrical labor unions in the 1970s quadrupled the 
labor costs involved in producing a Broadway show: 
Actors, musicians, stagehands, directors, choreographers, designers, ushers—all 
theater employees covered by unions saw spiraling increased wages and benefits.  In 
1956, the weekly expenses of My Fair Lady were $46,000 a week; in 2012, weekly 
expenses of Spider-Man: Turn Off the Dark were $1,000,000 per week, an increase of 
roughly 2,174 percent.  These increases had begun in the 1970s, and by the 1980s, the 
effect of these costs was seen in how Broadway was financed.29 
In addition, to compete with the proliferation of home-viewing options including 
cable television and video-cassette tapes, producers turned from challenging “art 
house” fare to more widely appealing big-budget spectacles.30  In the 1980s and 
1990s, two new producing models emerged to accommodate these growing costs:  
 
 24. Id.  
 25. Paul Sherman, Legal and Business Aspects of Financing Broadway Productions, in 
FINANCING A THEATRICAL PRODUCTION 491 (Joseph Taubman ed., 1964). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  The most successful example of a “Broadway broker” is the Mutual Benefit Financial 
Service Company, also known as “Fisco.”  Fisco was an almost dormant broker-dealer operation when 
Karen Goodwin, the Vice President in charge of corporate strategy, recruited her friend Elizabeth 
Williams, an art history professor, to serve on the board of Fisco’s new art fund.  Ms. Goodwin and Ms. 
Williams had the idea “to approach theater producers and offer, in effect, to serve as their investment 
banker.”  In 1983, the Goodwin-Williams team led Fisco to directly invest $150,000 in the Royal 
Shakespeare Company’s New York run of All’s Well That Ends Well.  Although Fisco lost two-thirds of 
its investment, it later seized the opportunity to raise one-third of the capitalization of the original 
London production of Les Misérables.  After the success of Les Misérables, Ms. Goodwin and Ms. 
Williams left Fisco to form their own production company, but they remained Fisco’s exclusive advisers 
on entertainment investments for a number of years.  See Brooke Kroeger, Raising a Million for ‘Les 
Mis’, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 1987), https://nyti.ms/2Hh6HMz.  
 28. Patrick Healy, I Want to Be a Producer (Me Too!), N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014), 
https://nyti.ms/2k8yVgk. 
 29. HURWITZ, supra note 14, at 203. 
 30. Id.  
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the corporate producer model and the multiple producers (or co-producers) 
model.31 
The “corporate producer” refers to a corporate entity formed to develop, 
produce, or participate in the production of Broadway shows.  Clear Channel 
Entertainment, for example, produced thirty-six productions between 1995 and 
2005.32  Because Clear Channel Entertainment was a subsidiary of larger 
corporation that owned billboards, radio stations, and television stations, Clear 
Channel Entertainment could exploit these media outlets to market and advertise its 
own theatrical productions.33  
Perhaps the best illustration of the corporate producer is Disney Theatrical 
Productions.  A part of Walt Disney Studios—one of four major business segments 
of the Walt Disney Company—Disney Theatrical’s finances are managed in 
combination with the Studios’ finances.34  Still, under the leadership of its 
president, Thomas Schumacher, Disney Theatrical enjoys “unprecedented” 
independence from its parent corporation.35  Interestingly, Disney aroused both 
skepticism and hostility when it entered the Broadway landscape: 
This season, the role of the Beast, usually played on Broadway by the Shubert 
Organization with its 16 theaters, will be played instead by the Walt Disney 
Company, which is almost single-handedly rejuvenating 42d Street by renovating the 
New Amsterdam Theater.  It is also producing the most expensive Broadway musical 
in theater history, opening tomorrow night at the Palace Theater.  What’s that?  
Booing?  Applause?  Both.  It is the oldest tradition in the theater to giveth with one 
hand and clubbeth with the other, and this year is no different.  Broadway is finding 
that it loves to love Disney.  But it still can’t help hating itself in the morning. . . . The 
rivalry is intensified because this time, real estate is involved, not to mention 
government subsidy in the form of a $21 million low-interest loan to help Disney 
renovate the 91-year-old New Amsterdam, a perk that other Broadway theater owners 
 
 31. The 1980s also saw the emergence of the mega-musical:  “By the 1980s the costs of 
production had risen so high and the market had been so fractured that the only way to recoup and make 
a profit was to have a long run in New York with cloned companies of the show in major cities around 
the world and on tours, to strategically saturate the market.  This spawned the mega-musical; instead of 
distributing investment across a range of musicals in a season, one massive hit was the only route to 
financial success. . . . .Mega-musicals leaned heavily on spectacle.  Just as simple stories and car chases 
made action movies easily exportable to foreign markets, simple stories with heavy elements of stage 
spectacle made musicals easily exportable to foreign markets and highly attractive to foreign tourists 
with little command of English.”  HURWITZ, supra note 14, at 206-7.  Cameron Mackintosh, the 
mastermind of the mega-musical, exploited this idea with his productions of Cats, Les Misérables, and 
The Phantom of the Opera.  Although Mackintosh’s international-focus proved novel, his producing 
model was not very different from Merrick’s.  Mackintosh retained almost exclusive control over his 
properties, and raised money from a limited number of large investors.  See Jessica Sternfeld, Cameron 
Mackintosh: Modern Global Impresario, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF MUSICAL THEATRE 
PRODUCERS, supra note 12, at 311, 314. 
 32. HURWITZ, supra note 14, at 216; The Dodgers, INTERNET BROADWAY DATABASE, 
https://perma.cc/ZEJ2-ADXY (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
 33. HURWITZ, supra note 14, at 216.  
 34. Amy S. Osatinsky, Disney Theatrical Productions:  Anything Can Happen If You Let It, in 
THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF MUSICAL THEATRE PRODUCERS, supra note 12, at 413, 414. 
 35. Id. 
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have historically been denied.  One of them calls the Disney situation similar to Wal-
Mart opening in a small town, sending the local merchants into an escalating panic.36 
But after producing ten musicals, including the long-running The Lion King—now 
the highest grossing entertainment property in history37—Disney has demonstrated 
both its staying power and its value to the Broadway economy.  
Along with the corporate producer model—which has been utilized by a number 
of additional movie and television studios with live stage subsidiaries—the co-
producers model dominates the Broadway landscape today.  As described in the 
Introduction, the co-producers model involves the recognition of a large number of 
producers who collectively raise a production’s capitalization.  Motivated by the 
rising cost of Broadway shows, this practice has grown over time: 
Victor/Victoria listed seven lead producers, a co-producer and four associate 
producers.  Broadway grew further removed from the single visionary producer 
mounting a production based on his or her personal aesthetic.  The “David Merricks,” 
“Joseph Papps” and “Stuart Ostrows” were replaced by board of individuals and 
corporate representatives each with their own interests to protect . . . . And it got 
worse; although twelve producers were not uncommon on a single show in the 1990s, 
the number would escalate.  Hairspray (2002) listed twenty producing partners; Catch 
Me If You Can (2011) listed thirty.38 
The next section will describe the co-producers model in greater detail. 
II. THE CURRENT MODEL OF BROADWAY PRODUCING 
Under the current model of Broadway producing, after a producer has chosen a 
play or musical to stage, hired core members of the creative team, and outlined a 
timeline for the production, they will begin to raise the show’s capitalization.39  
The timing of fundraising requires “careful consideration.”40  Investors might be 
hesitant to contribute funds before “essential elements” such as the theater or stars 
are in place, but producers will need cash on hand to cover a show’s start-up costs, 
including legal and accounting services and developmental workshops.41  Under 
New York securities law, a production can raise “front money”—that is, money to 
cover these early start-up costs—without triggering state filing requirements (as 
described in Section III) if the producer limits the front money offering to a 
maximum of four accredited investors (as defined in Footnote 60).42  In return for 
 
 36. Alex Witchel, Is Disney the Newest Broadway Baby, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 1994), 
https://nyti.ms/2K2RAUW. 
 37. Lee Seymour, Over the Last 20 Years, Broadway’s ‘Lion King’ Has Made More Money for 
Disney than ‘Star Wars’, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/KAK8-CHJU.  
 38. HURWITZ, supra note 14, at 216. 
 39. JOHN BREGLIO, I WANNA BE A PRODUCER:  HOW TO MAKE A KILLING ON BROADWAY…OR 
GET KILLED 161 (2016). 
 40. Id.   
 41. Id. 
 42. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 13, § 50.1.  However, many theatrical attorneys believe 
that after the passage of the 1996 National Securities Market Improvement Act, a principle feature of 
which is “the federal preemption of state securities laws in connection with offerings of securities which 
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waiving any claim for reimbursement of the investment in the event that the 
producer abandons the production, the investor will often receive an additional 
share of the adjusted net profits (as defined in Section V(D)) from the producer.43 
To finance theatrical productions, producers typically form investment vehicles 
and then sell investment interests in those vehicles.  Until 1990, producers 
structured theatrical syndication financing arrangements via limited partnerships 
(“LPs”).44  The adoption of state legislation during the 1990s, however, authorizing 
limited liability companies (“LLCs”),45 offered producers a “viable alternative 
financing structure.”46  Today, producers use both LP and LLC arrangements to 
finance their shows.  Under both structures, an investor’s47 liability is limited to the 
amount invested.48  However, a general partner in a LP is liable for losses realized 
by the production beyond the partner’s initial investment, and even beyond the 
show’s total capitalization.49  As such, if the lead producer is an individual rather 
than an incorporated entity, they may use an LLC to shield themselves from any 
personal liability. 
If an individual or entity contributes or bundles a large enough share of the 
production’s capitalization, they may receive billing as a co-producer of the 
production, on marketing materials above-the-title of the play (“above-the-title 
producer credit”).  Typically, the production will recognize the general partner or 
managing member as the lead producer by listing their name before all others, often 
on a line of their own.50  Productions also distinguish between executive producers, 
who supervise the day-to-day management of the production, and associate 
producers, who raise or invest at a level below the other co-producers.51  The 
capital requirements for co-producers and associate producers, however, vary from 
show to show.   
III. SECURITIES REGULATIONS 
A security is “a share, participation, or other interest in [a] property or in an 
entity of [an] issuer” that entitles the holder to a share of the issuer’s earnings.52  
 
comply with the requirements of Rule 506 of Regulation D” (see infra note 58), the limitation to four 
front money investors is no longer enforceable.  Elliot H. Brown & Daniel M. Wasser, A Practical 
Guide to Theatrical Financing, 16 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 6, 9 (Fall 1998). 
 43. BREGLIO, supra note 39, at 161. 
 44. Limited partnerships are run by general partners, who pool the capital of limited partners to 
form the investment vehicle.  
 45. Limited liability companies are run by managing members, who pool the capital of 
investment members to form the investment vehicle.   
 46. Brown & Wasser, supra note 42.  
 47. Here, the term “investor” refers to any individual or entity who contributes or bundles a share 
of the production’s capitalization other than the general partner or managing member.   
 48. BREGLIO, supra note 39, at 162. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 193.   
 51. Interview with Steven Chaikelson, Head of the Theatre Management & Producing 
Concentration, Colum. Univ. School of the Arts Theatre Program, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 21, 2017). 
 52. Securities, Accounting Standards Codification, § 320-10-20 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
2009). 
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Examples of securities include banknotes, bonds, and shares of equity interest in a 
company’s capital stock.  Because the sale of investment interests in a LP or LLC 
constitutes the sale of securities, it may be subject to both state and federal 
securities regulations.53  
In 1933, Congress passed the Securities Act, the objective of which was (1) to 
ensure that investors receive certain “significant information concerning securities 
being offered for public sale” and (2) to “prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and 
fraud in the sale of securities.”54  To achieve these objectives, the Securities Act 
required that securities sold in the United States be registered with the SEC.  
Generally, registration forms compel advance disclosure of the offering including a 
description of the company’s business, a description of the security being offered 
for sale, information about the management of the company, and financial 
statements certified by independent accountants.55  
Under authority granted in the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, the 
New York Department of Law developed its own regulatory scheme, separate from 
federal registration requirements, specifically related to offerings of theatrical 
investment interests.56  Section 23.03(3)(a) of the Law provides:  
[N]o offering of syndication interests in a theatrical production company, as defined 
herein, shall be made within or from this state without the use of a prospectus or 
offering circular making full and fair disclosure of material facts pertaining to the 
particular venture.  The attorney general may also issue rules and regulations 
requiring the submission to prospective investors in such offerings an offering circular 
and amendments thereto containing a concise and accurate description of the nature of 
the offering, profits to promoters and others, the background of the producers, a 
description of subsidiary rights and other pertinent information as will afford potential 
investors or purchasers and participants an adequate basis upon which to found their 
judgment[.] 
Broadway producers complained that these overlapping state and federal 
securities regulations increased the cost and time involved in raising the requisite 
capital for a Broadway show.57  In fact, the state regulatory framework often 
delayed the production timeline, with production counsel required to submit 
multiple drafts of the offering papers to the New York State Attorney General’s 
office before they were approved for distribution to potential investors—a process 
that could take weeks or even months.  Fortunately for producers, Section 5 of the 
Securities Act exempts from federal registration requirements certain private 
offerings made to a limited number of investors, the rules for which are contained 
in Regulation D.  And in 1996, Congress passed the National Securities Market 
Improvement Act (“NSMIA”), a principle feature of which is “the federal 
preemption of state securities laws in connection with offerings of securities which 
 
 53. Id.  
 54. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/TG62-4Y6K.  
 55. Id.   
 56. Brown & Wasser, supra note 42. 
 57. Id.   
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comply with the requirements of Rule 506 of Regulation D.”58  Now, theatrical 
offerings that comply with Rule 506 of Regulation D are exempt from both federal 
and state registration requirements. 
When producers sell equity interests in theatrical productions to investors, they 
typically try to fit their offerings into the Regulation D, Rule 506 safe harbor.59  
Under Rule 506, a company can be assured that its offering falls within the safe 
harbor if it:  (1) does not use general solicitation or advertising to market the 
securities, and (2) does not sell the securities to more than thirty-five non-
accredited, sophisticated investors.60  Rule 506 imposes no limitation on the 
amount of money that companies can raise. 
Even under Regulation D private offerings, however, companies are subject to 
the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities law, and cannot engage unregistered 
broker-dealers to effectuate transactions for their accounts.61  The next section will 
ask whether money-bundling Broadway co-producers are acting as unregistered 
broker-dealers in violation of the applicable SEC requirements. 
IV. BROKER-DEALER REGULATIONS 
Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Exchange Act defines a “broker” as “any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others.”  Under Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, it is “unlawful for any broker 
or dealer . . . to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any security . . . 
unless such broker or dealer is . . . registered” with the SEC.62  
“A person or entity may perform a narrow scope of activities without triggering 
broker/dealer [sic] registration requirements.”63  Through the issuance of several 
no-action letters, the SEC has differentiated “broker-dealers” from “finders,” which 
are “persons who do nothing more than introduce prospective investors to the 
issuer”.64  A finder “will be performing the functions of a broker-dealer, triggering 
registration requirements, if activities include:  analyzing the financial needs of an 
 
 58. Id.   
 59. Jason Baruch, Exit Sage Left, Enter Stage Right: Theatre Trends Over the Past 25 Years, 
SENDROFF & BARUCH, LLP, https://perma.cc/DS97-LFLK (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
 60. Section 501 of the Securities Act defines an “accredited investor” as any person “whose 
individual net worth, or joint net worth with [their] spouse, exceeds $1,000,000.”  A non-accredited, 
sophisticated investor, as defined under Section 505, is any person whose net worth is below $1,000,000 
but who has “sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to [be] capable of 
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.”  Of note, the 2012 JOBS (Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups) Act amended Rule 506 by adding a new Section 506(c), under which a company can 
use general solicitation or advertising to market the securities and still be considered a private offering.  
For a publicized private offering to qualify under Rule 506(c), however, all investors must be accredited. 
See U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/4AFN-V8W2. 
 61. Steven R. Watts, SEC Cracks Down on Unregistered Broker-Dealers in Private Offerings, 42 
SEC. REG. L. J. 69 (2014). 
 62. Internal punctuation omitted.  
 63. Cornhusker Energy Lexington, LLC v. Prospect St. Ventures, No. 8:04CV586, 2006 WL 
2620985, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2006). 
 64. Watts, supra note 61.  
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issuer, recommending or designing financing methods, involvement in 
negotiations, discussion of details of securities transactions, making investment 
recommendations, and prior involvement in the sale of securities.”65  The 
finder/broker distinction is analyzed under a four-factor test, described below.  
A. THE “BROKER-DEALER” TEST 
In determining whether a person is a broker-dealer or a finder, the SEC 
considers four principal factors:  whether the person (1) actively solicited investors, 
(2) advised investors as to the merits of an investment, (3) received transaction-
based compensation, and (4) regularly participates in security transactions.66  No 
one factor is dispositive, and a person need not meet all four of these factors to be 
considered a broker-dealer by the SEC.  “A ‘yes’ answer to any of these factors 
indicates that registration may be required.”67 
V. APPLYING THE “BROKER-DEALER” TEST TO THE ACTIVITIES 
OF BROADWAY CO-PRODUCERS 
A. CONDUCT THAT FALLS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE “BROKER-DEALER” 
DEFINITION 
Not all Broadway co-producers actively bundle money from investors.  Tony 
Award®-winning Broadway producer Barbara Whitman (Fun Home and Fully 
Committed) explains that co-producers often just write a check to cover their unit of 
the capitalization:  “An awful lot of them just write a check.  They are wealthy 
people who buy billing for one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars to two 
hundred fifty thousand dollars.”68  Because these co-producers do not raise money 
from third parties, they fall outside of the scope of the “broker-dealer” definition. 
Similarly, a grouping of investors might choose to form a syndicate, an 
“investment vehicle” that permits multiple individuals to co-invest under one 
collective name.69  When a syndicate invests in a Broadway production, the 
production will generally make any financial distributions directly to that collective 
entity, which is then responsible for proportioning the distributions amongst the 
 
 65. Cornhusker, 2006 WL 2620985 at *6. 
 66. Watts, supra note 61;  see also Steve Ganis, Jeremy D. Glaser, & Jake Romero, Using 
Finders to Assist in Financings Can Impose Significant Risks, INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, 
June 2011, at 18; In the Matter of David C. Sorrells, Respondent, Exchange Act Release No. 31265, 
2014 WL 4792091 (Sept. 25, 2014) (finding that respondent violated Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act 
because he “(1) directly and regularly solicited current and prospective insurance clients for investments 
in Arete and the Snisky PIVs; (2) advised prospective investors on the specific details and merits of the 
investments; (3) received transaction-based compensation for bringing in money from investors; and (4) 
participated at key points in the investment chain.”).  
 67. Watts, supra note 61. 
 68. Interview with Barbara Whitman & Tom Casserly, Broadway Producers, in N.Y., N.Y. (July 
26, 2016). 
 69. See The Basics of Startup Syndicate Funding, STARTUP XPLORE, https://perma.cc/EV47-
EZZP (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).  
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syndicate’s investors.70  Because a lead producer will deal directly with an 
investing syndicate, no middleman exists to trigger broker-dealer registration 
requirements.71 
B. FACTOR (1):  ACTIVE SOLICITATION 
The first factor of the broker-dealer test asks whether the intermediary in a 
transaction for the sale of securities engaged in active solicitation of potential 
investors.  The SEC generally defines “solicitation” in the context of broker-dealer 
regulation as “any affirmative effort by a broker or dealer intended to induce 
transactional business for the broker-dealer or its affiliates.”72  General solicitation 
includes, but is not limited to, “(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other 
communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or 
broadcast over television or radio; and (2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees 
have been invited by any general solicitation or general advertising.”73  
It is immaterial under the broker-dealer test whether the intermediary solicits 
potential investors or actual investors.  In 2008, Brumberg, Mackey & Wall, P.L.C. 
(“BMW”) considered entering into an agreement with Electronic Magnetic Power 
Solutions, Inc. (“EMPS”) whereby BMW would help EMPS to raise funds to 
finance its operations and development in return for a percentage of the gross 
amount raised.  Requesting a no-action letter concerning its conduct as an 
unregistered broker-dealer, BMW explained that it would introduce to EMPS only 
“individuals and entities ‘who may have an interest’ in providing financing to 
EMPS through investments in equity or debt instruments of EMPS.”74  The 
Division of Trading and Markets, however, advised that it was unable to assure 
BMW that it would not recommend enforcement action: 
The Staff believes that the introduction to EMPS of only those persons with a 
potential interest in investing in EMPS’s securities implies that BMW anticipates both 
“pre-screening” potential investors to determine their eligibility to purchase the 
securities, and “pre-selling” EMPS’s securities to gauge the investors’ interest. . . . 
[T]he Staff believes that your proposed activities would require broker-dealer 
registration.75 
Often, experienced Broadway producers do not actively solicit investors, either 
actual or potential.76  Already branded as industry insiders, these producers have 
circles of friends and colleagues who turn to the producers to signal their own 
 
 70. Interview with Barbara Whitman & Tom Casserly, supra note 68.  
 71. Interview with an experienced theatrical attorney who wishes to remain anonymous (Aug. 2, 
2016). 
 72. ROBERT J. HAFT, ARTHUR F. HAFT & MICHELLE HUDSON, ANALYSIS OF KEY SEC NO-
ACTION LETTERS § 9:18 (2017).   
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). 
 74. Brumberg, Mackey & Wall, P.L.C., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 1976174, at *3 (May 
17, 2010) (emphasis added). 
 75. Id., at *2. 
 76. Interview with anonymous theatrical attorney, supra note 71.   
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interest in investing in a Broadway show.  Many other Broadway co-producers, 
however, do exhibit conduct that would probably meet the SEC’s definition of 
active solicitation.  
Some producers send mass e-mails describing investment opportunities to 
friends, colleagues, and other industry professionals who they may not even know 
personally:  “Hey everybody, I’m working on this really great show . . . I saw it at 
NAMT77 and signed up immediately.  [Investment] units [start at] twenty-five 
thousand dollars—let me know if you’re interested.”78  Others share posts on 
Facebook, visible to both friends and public groups, advertising opportunities to 
invest on Broadway.  A search on Facebook using combinations of the terms 
“Broadway,” “investment,” “opportunity,” and “producer” reveals many such 
examples of this practice: 
Hey Y’all!  I’m producing the Broadway Revival of Pump Boys and Dinettes starring 
Bo Bice!  If you’d like to invest in Broadway, and attend opening night and afterparty 
(backstage tour included), or would like to see more information on it, please feel free 
to email me at [contact information omitted].79   
An American in Paris is on Turner Classic Movies 2pm today ,, [sic] if you are 
interested in investing in the new Broadway Musical (An American in Paris - The 
Musical), we are down to the last few shares ($25,000) buy in…  Call/text [contact 
information omitted] or email me here or at [contact information omitted] with your 
email address if interested or if any questions!  (it’s a Great Experience to make $ 
investing/producing Broadway Musicals, plus the perks of opening night, Opening 
Night Cast Party, etc… [sic]80 
If you haven’t seen it yet, check out the awesome initial TVC teaser for The Visit 
Musical which opens on Broadway this March, starring the inimitable Chita Rivera!  
I’m incredibly excited to be part of the producing team and am happy to discuss 
further with anyone that might be interested in investing in the production.  Drop me a 
line and say hi!81 
This conduct likely meets the SEC’s definition of “solicitation” and could 
therefore trigger broker-dealer registration requirements.  Section 502(c) of the 
Securities Act does not enumerate e-mails and social media postings as examples 
of solicitation; nonetheless, the SEC has identified them as such.  The SEC has 
singled out unregistered brokers for targeting investors via both individual e-
mails82 and mass e-mail campaigns.83  And, in a recent case, the SEC charged an 
unregistered broker for advertising investment opportunities on LinkedIn.84  
 
 77. National Alliance for Musical Theatre. 
 78. Interview with Barbra Whitman & Tom Casserly, supra note 68.   
 79. FACEBOOK (Jan. 10, 2013) (posted in the OWU Class of 1998 group).   
 80. FACEBOOK (Nov. 2, 2014).  
 81. FACEBOOK (Feb. 18, 2015).  
 82. See S.E.C. v. Helms, No. A-13-CV-01036 ML, 2015 WL 6438872, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 
2015) (“In support of this argument, Barrera offers no new evidence to rebut the emails and deposition 
testimony previously submitted by the SEC.  This previously submitted evidence establishes . . . Sellers 
subsequently copied Barrera on . . . an email solicitation offering Moore a second investment 
opportunity, the “Vesta” portfolio (in which Moore/Vendetta never invested).”); see also S.E.C. v. 
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Further, although the JOBS Act amended Rule 506 to permit general solicitation 
in private placements, it did not waive broker registration requirements for such 
transactions.  The SEC clarified this distinction in In the Matter of Anthony Fields:  
Fields was a broker according to his own description—he described himself as an 
intermediary who introduced a buyer and seller and expected to receive commissions 
on transactions that occurred.  The evidence of record contains examples of his 
attempts to broker transactions in instruments that he had advertised on social media. . 
. . Fields argues that he was not required to be registered as a broker because the 
contemplated transactions were private placements.  This argument confuses the 
exemption from registration of instruments that can be the subject of private 
placements with the requirement for a broker to be registered.  Accordingly, Fields 
violated Exchange Act Section 15(a)(1).85 
C. FACTOR (2):  INVESTOR ADVICE 
Factor (2) of the broker-dealer registration test asks whether the intermediary 
advised the investor as to the merits of the investment.  The SEC has defined 
investor advice as discussions about “the advisability of investing in, or . . . reports 
or analyses as to, specific securities or specific categories of securities.”86 
Rule 202(a)(11)-1 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 exempts from advisor 
registration “advice that is solely incidental to the broker-dealer’s business or 
account,” such as advice as to whether the investor “enter or to stay out of the 
market in general”.87  However, any “recommendation” or “endorsement” of 
“specific securities” will constitute investment advice.88 
Theatrical attorneys counsel managing producers to prohibit their co-producers 
from offering investors any information that the SEC might consider to be investor 
advice under the broker-dealer registration test:  “The producer’s instructions to the 
co-producer are ‘Don’t give any projections other than the projections that we 
provide you with,’ and presumably the managing producer doesn’t continue to 
 
Mapp, et. Al., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99429 (Oct. 07, 2016) (“The Commission first alleges that Paxton 
violated Section 17(b) by forwarding one of Mapp’s promotional emails to a potential investor on July 
23, 2011.”).  
 83. See S.E.C. v. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-00621-EJL, 2014 WL 2515710, 
at *1 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014) (“[T]he SEC alleges the Defendants used mass email distributions of 
offering documents called Private Placement Memoranda (“PPMs”) and other materials to solicit 
potential investors through supporters, paid promoters, and other finders; inviting them to forward the 
PPMs on to potential investors.”).  
 84. In the Matter of Anthony Fields, CPA d/b/a Anthony Fields & Assocs. & d/b/a Platinum Sec. 
Brokers, Release No. 474 (Dec. 5, 2012) (“LinkedIn is an online social network with a business to 
business (B2B) emphasis.  LinkedIn has various discussion groups that users, such as Fields, can join. 
Such social media sites are an efficient way to reach potential investors.  Fields advertised the 
availability of BGs and MTNs on LinkedIn and on two other B2B sites, TradeKey and E-2/Commerce, 
during 2010 and 2011.  Fields’s profile on LinkedIn during 2010 and 2011 contained links to AFA’s and 
Platinum’s websites.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. Donald F. Pooley, 1985 WL 52042, at *1 (S.E.C. No - Action Letter Feb. 8, 1985).  
 87. Kevin Keogh, Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, BANKING & 
FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 3 (June 2005). 
 88. The Inv. Archive, LLC, 2010 WL 2030233, at *4 (S.E.C. No - Action Letter May 14, 2010). 
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work with anyone who they feel is not observing [those instructions].”89  However, 
co-producers do not always follow such instructions: 
You try as best you can [to regulate what a co-producer can and cannot say].  I 
personally try to bring in people who I feel will accurately represent the show.  Many 
people are not able to control their co-producers that much . . . and we have had issues 
with people [exaggerating] their involvement in the show and the show’s [financial] 
prospects.90 
Take, for example, the following Facebook solicitation:  
It’s very rare to get an opportunity to invest & produce a future Broadway Hit 
Musical, we are bringing Anastasia to Broadway late next year, if you know anyone 
who has $25,000 or more to invest or if you want to buy in, call/text me [contact 
information omitted]!!!  A number of experts thought we could beat Hamilton for the 
Tony, but we will enter the race the following years to increase our chances which 
will lead to a longer and more Successful run.91 
Here, the producer does not just advertise the existence of an investment 
opportunity; they also offer projections about the show’s commercial prospects, 
referring to it as a “future Broadway hit” that will likely enjoy a “long” and 
“successful” run.  Although the producer likely considered their post an innocuous 
promotion, the SEC might read it as intending to educate prospective investors “as 
to the value of the securities involved,” which constitutes investment advice that 
may trigger broker-dealer registration requirements.92  Any representation that a 
co-producer makes to a potential investor outside of the representations explicitly 
contained in the offering papers might qualify as investor advice under this second 
factor. 
D. FACTOR (3):  TRANSACTION-BASED COMPENSATION 
Factor (3) asks whether the intermediary received “transaction-based 
compensation,” which is defined as a “commission” paid to the intermediary for 
effectuating a transaction.93  In a 2010 no-action letter, the SEC opined that the 
receipt of transaction-based compensation alone, without any of the other three 
factors, “triggers the broker registration requirement.”94  Although the 
Commission’s 2010 position is “neither legally binding nor persuasive,” it signals 
the importance of this third factor.95 
 
 89. Interview with anonymous theatrical attorney, supra note 71. 
 90. Interview with Barbra Whitman & Tom Casserly, supra note 68. 
 91. FACEBOOK (July 18, 2015).  
 92. Ganis et al., supra note 66, at 5.   
 93. Cornhusker Energy Lexington, LLC v. Prospect St. Ventures, No. 8:04CV586, 2006 WL 
2620985, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2006). 
 94. S.E.C. v. Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341 n.51 (M.D. Fla. 2011).  
 95. Id.; see also Landegger v. Cohen, No. 11-CV-01760-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 5444052, at *5 
(D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2013) (“Of these factors, some courts have also held that the transaction-based 
compensation factor, is one of the hallmarks of broker status.”). 
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Money-bundling Broadway co-producers are typically compensated post-
recoupment from a production’s adjusted net profits.96  “Adjusted net profits are 
the weekly operating profits available for distribution to the producer and the 
investors after payment of net profits to third parties, such as stars, authors [and] 
underlying rights owners.”97  As a rule, adjusted net profits are split “50-50”98 
between the producers and investors.99  “The money paid to the investors is divided 
pro rata and pari passu (at the same time) among them in accordance with the 
respective amounts contributed by each.”100  For purposes of example, if an 
investor invests one hundred thousand dollars in a production capitalized at one 
million dollars, they will be entitled to ten percent of the investor’s share of 
adjusted net profits, equal to five percent of the total adjusted net profits.  Similarly, 
the money payable to producers is usually divided pro rata in accordance with their 
respective amounts raised, after an off-the-top deduction of a “torchbearer share” 
payable to the lead producer or producers in consideration for their efforts in 
developing the project and managing the day-to-day operations (i.e., if a co-
producer raises one hundred thousand dollars for a production capitalized at one 
million dollars, they will be entitled to ten percent of the producer’s share of 
adjusted net profits, after the torchbearer’s share has been deducted).101  
Sometimes, a producer will choose to allocate a portion of their adjusted net profits 
to an investor, often as a “kicker” to incentivize investor participation at a certain 
monetary level.102 
The theatre industry is of the opinion that this form of producer compensation 
does not qualify as transaction-based compensation: 
It would only be somebody who was inexperienced in the Broadway world who 
would propose to compensate a bundler with anything other than a share of adjusted 
net profits . . . . What you don’t have in theater . . . is people who are paying bundlers 
a percentage of the money that they raised. . . . On the rare occasions when that has 
arisen, I’ve said, “Absolutely, you can do that if (1) it is disclosed and (2) the party 
that you’re dealing with is a registered broker-dealer.”  What’s the distinction between 
somebody who is getting paid on the basis of a classic commission vs. the 
arrangement that we have which is payment out of the producer’s share of adjusted 
net profits?  Whether it would hold up to scrutiny or not, what we’ve gotten ourselves 
comfortable with is the notion that whatever arrangement is being made with this 
bundler has no impact on investors.  The securities laws are here to protect investors.  
No investor’s capital contribution is being diminished by a fee that is being paid. . . . 
 
 96. BREGLIO, supra note 39, at 167. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Here, the term “producer” refers to any individual or entity that bundles money for the 
production company, including the general partner or managing member of the company.  The term 
“investor” refers to any individual or entity that directly contributes funds to the capitalization of the 
production company.  An individual or entity that bundles a unit of the capitalization, part of which 
includes its own funds, will be considered both a “producer” and an “investor”.   
 100. Id. (emphasis added).  
 101. Interview with Steven Chaikelson, supra note 51.  
 102. Id.  
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In this scenario, the gross proceeds are still the gross proceeds. . . . No harm, no 
foul.103 
The theatre industry distinguishes producer compensation from transaction-based 
compensation because it is not taken off the top of the investor’s capital 
contribution.  Legal precedent, however, suggests that producer compensation out 
of a share of the adjusted net profits could, in fact, meet the SEC’s definition of 
“transaction-based compensation.”  
First, federal courts have equated “transaction-based compensation” with a 
“commission,”104 which Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “a fee paid to an agent 
or employee for a particular transaction, usually as a percentage of the money 
received from the transaction.”105  Although this definition indicates that a 
“commission” usually takes the form of an off-the-top payment, it does not 
expressly limit the term to such.  
Second, the underlying concern of “transaction-based compensation” is not that 
it will diminish an investor’s capital contribution, but rather that it “represents a 
potential incentive for abusive sales practices that registration is intended to 
regulate and prevent.”106  If an intermediary is to receive a fee for effectuating a 
transaction, that intermediary may be incentivized to misrepresent the value of the 
security or securities involved, thereby increasing the likelihood that the investor 
actually invests.  As such, the key inquiry regarding intermediary compensation is 
whether such compensation is tied to the transaction—i.e. compensation paid only 
if the transaction closes.  The only form of intermediary compensation unlikely to 
trigger broker registration requirements is a fee paid to a finder solely for 
introducing a potential investor to an issuer, regardless of whether or not that 
investor actually invests.  
A co-producer is compensated only if they actually effectuate the transaction.  In 
fact, a co-producer share of the adjusted net profits will often increase based on the 
amount of money that the co-producer raises.  Accordingly, producer compensation 
out of the producer’s share of adjusted net profits will likely meet the definition of 
“transaction-based compensation” under factor (3) of the SEC’s broker-dealer 
registration test.  
E. FACTOR (4):  REGULAR PARTICIPATION IN SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 
The final factor of the SEC’s broker-dealer registration test asks whether the 
intermediary regularly participates in securities transactions.  “The SEC is 
concerned that persons who have been barred from engaging in the purchase or sale 
of securities will attempt to operate as ‘finders’ in order to evade registration 
requirements.  As such, a finder’s prior experience in dealing securities . . . can 
trigger registration requirements. . . .”107  “Regularity of participation has been 
 
 103. Interview with anonymous theatrical attorney, supra note 71. 
 104. Cornhusker Energy Lexington, 2006 WL 2620985 at *6. 
 105. COMMISSION, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 106. Cornhusker Energy Lexington, 2006 WL 2620985 at *6.  
 107. Ganis et al., supra note 66, at 5. 
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demonstrated by . . . the dollar amount of securities sold . . . and the extent to which 
advertisement and investor solicitation were used.”108  If an intermediary solicits an 
investment “on a single, isolated basis . . . such person might not be acting as a 
‘broker’ or ‘dealer’ as these terms are defined in . . . the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.”109  However, “if such activity is engaged in more often than on a single 
isolated basis,” broker-dealer registration may be required.110 
When an individual or entity solicits investments for a single production, such 
conduct would be unlikely to equate to regular participation.  Of note, in Somerset 
Communications Group v. Wall to Wall Advertising, the court found that an entity 
formed for the sole purpose of purchasing units in a single company, and issuing 
those units to investors, was not regularly participating in the market for 
securities.111  If a producer, however, is actively engaged in the Broadway business, 
they might meet the participation threshold for broker registration.  “Nobody does 
this for a living, but many people do it on a regular basis.”112 
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF USING AN UNREGISTERED BROKER 
A. LEGAL PENALTIES 
An investor who purchases a unit of a production’s capitalization through an 
unregistered broker may be entitled to rescission of the investment agreement.  
Whereas Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits a broker from buying or 
selling securities without registering with the SEC, Section 29(b) (codified as 15 
USC § 78cc (b)) provides a remedy for violations of 15(a): 
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder . . . shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in 
violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the 
performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not 
being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual 
knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such 
contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation. 
There exists judicial uncertainty as to the reach of Section 29(b).  In Zerman v. 
Jacobs, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that 
under 29(b), “only unlawful contracts may be rescinded, not unlawful transactions 
made pursuant to lawful contracts.”113  Under the Zerman holding, an investor 
 
 108. S.E.C. v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1998) (internal citation 
omitted).  
 109. Joseph Mcculley Sales, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 78,982 (S.E.C. No - Action Letter Sept. 1, 1972). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Somerset Commc’n Group., LLC v. Wall to Wall Advert., Inc., No. C13-2084 JCC, 2016 WL 
4063938, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (“[T]he only securities transactions properly before the 
Court are Somerset’s purchase of units in Fourpoints, and Somerset’s issuance of its own units to 
investors.  This does not equal the ‘regularity of participation’ that would have required Somerset . . . to 
register as a dealer.”).  
 112. Interview with anonymous theatrical attorney, supra note 71.  
 113. Zerman v. Jacobs, 510 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 672 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1981).  
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cannot base a rescission right upon a broker’s failure to register, provided that the 
investment agreement is itself lawful.  Later courts, however, have narrowed this 
ruling,114 and the American Bar Association Task Force Report on private 
placement broker-dealers suggests that the language in 29(b) is broad enough to 
offer investors a rescission right: 
This section suggests that in any civil litigation an unregistered agent acting on behalf 
of the issuer will be compelled to return their commissions, fees and expenses; and 
that the issuer may justifiably refuse to pay commissions, fees and expenses at closing 
or recoup them at a later time.  It also raises the question of whether the issuer can be 
compelled to repay these funds to an investor, since the unregistered broker-dealer is 
acting on behalf of the issuer. 
The investor may also be entitled to return of his or her investment, since the purchase 
contract between the issuer and the investor is a contract which is part of an illegal 
arrangement with the unregistered financial intermediary, and that intermediary is 
engaged in the offer and sale of the security to the investor.  The language to Section 
29(b) is broad enough to permit such an interpretation.  
Our research found little guidance on this type of case.  Experience tells us that 
litigation involving unregistered broker-dealers or agents is often quickly settled.  
Furthermore, a reference to a state regulatory authority or the SEC will often produce 
compelling pressure for prompt return of the funds.115 
Ultimately, an issuer who employs an unregistered broker to sell a security runs the 
risk of having to return the purchase price to the investor.  And even if an investor 
does not demand rescission, use of an unregistered broker can expose the issuer to a 
civil fine or penalty,116 and to enhanced SEC regulatory action in connection with 
future offerings, “for aiding and abetting the [intermediary’s] violation of the SEC 
broker-dealer registration requirements.”117  
B. UNSOPHISTICATED INTERMEDIARIES 
An issuer also exposes itself to liability by using an unsophisticated 
intermediary unaware of SEC regulations.  Of note, Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act prohibits issuers from using or employing “manipulative or deceptive devices 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”118  “It is well established that 
an action may be brought under section 10(b) . . . against a stockbroker who states 
an opinion without a genuine belief in its accuracy, or with a reckless disregard for 
 
 114. See Reg’l Properties, Inc. v. Fin. & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552, 560 (5th Cir. 
1982) (“Interpreting section 29(b) to render voidable those contracts that are either illegal when made or 
as in fact performed not only avoids these problems but also, in our view, most nearly comports with the 
language used in section 29(b).”). 
 115. The Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, ABA Section of Business & Law, 
Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, 60 BUS. LAW. 
959, 999 (2005). 
 116. United States Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Collyard, 154 F. Supp. 3d 781 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 117. Id.   
 118. GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 206 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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its truth or falsity.”119  This principle applies to “forecasts and predictions” as to the 
expected value of a security being offered for sale.120  For example, the Facebook 
solicitation reproduced in Section V(C), predicting that the new musical Anastasia 
will enjoy a long and successful run, might be found to violate Section 10(b) if a 
complainant can show that the producer made the prediction with “reckless 
disregard for its truth or falsity.”  An issuer will be held secondarily liable for the 
fraudulent statements of a broker if the issuer had “general awareness” of the 
violation and “knowingly and substantially assisted” it.121 
Fortunately for producers, liability under 10(b) is unlikely.  “Predictions and 
statements of opinion generally cannot form the basis of a fraud claim,”122 and 
under Second Circuit doctrine, “forward-looking recommendations and opinions 
are not actionable in securities fraud merely because they are misguided, imprudent 
or overly optimistic.”123  Further, producers will typically guard against liability by 
including in the offering papers language providing that only express 
representations are actionable: 
By executing this Agreement, each Investing Member represents and warrants to the 
Managing Member with full knowledge that the Managing Member and the Company 
intends to rely hereon, that Investing Member has not been induced to enter into this 
Agreement by any warranties, guarantees, promises, statements or representations, 
whether express or implied, except those that are expressly and specifically set forth 
in this Agreement, and that the Managing Member shall not be bound or liable in any 
manner by express or implied warranties, guarantees, promises, statements or 
representations pertaining to my investment, except as are expressly and specifically 
set forth in this Agreement. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Although responsible attorneys and producers are certain to include appropriate 
disclosures in theatrical offering papers and comply with blue sky filings, they 
rarely consider the requirement that intermediaries acting as broker-dealers register 
with the SEC.  An experienced theatrical attorney who wishes to remain 
anonymous explains, “Nobody really wants the technically correct answer to the 
[broker-dealer] question, because that is how the theatrical financing business 
pretty much works these days, [and] nobody wants to hear that it is fraught with 
legal issues that might question that mode of operation.”124 
Recognizing a willful ignorance on the part of theatre attorneys and producers, 
some in the industry contend that the SEC and New York Attorney General are 
unlikely to ever take regulatory action against Broadway producers,125 as they have 
 
 119. Filloramo v. Johnston, Lemon & Co., 697 F. Supp. 517, 521 (D.D.C. 1988). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Hutto v. Texas Income Properties Corp., 416 F. Supp. 478, 482 (S.D. Tex. 1976).  
 122. Morris Aviation, LLC v. Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-644-S, 2012 WL 
3684760, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 27, 2012), aff’d, 536 F. App’x 558 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 123. In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 124. Interview with anonymous theatrical attorney, supra note 71.   
 125. Interview with John Pinckard, Theatre Producer, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2017).  
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“bigger fish to fry.”126  Might these regulatory bodies, however, shift their attention 
to the Great White Way? 
In 2016, the Broadway blockbuster Hamilton opened, grossing nearly one 
hundred million dollars in its first year.127  At this rate, Hamilton’s New York 
production could gross over a billion dollars in its first decade.128  As shows like 
Hamilton demonstrate Broadway’s potential to be a cash cow, the SEC might divert 
regulatory focus toward the industry. 
Additionally, the Broadway industry has witnessed a number of fundraising 
scandals over the past few years.  In 2012, a Long Island stockbroker defrauded 
producers of the Broadway-bound musical Rebecca, convincing them that he was 
raising four and one-half million dollars from investors who turned out to be 
phantoms.129  The middleman was arrested and the show was never able to 
complete its fundraising for Broadway.  And in 2016, an investor pulled his funds 
from the Broadway musical Nerds just weeks before it was intended to open,130 
 
 126. The industry’s disregard for the SEC extends all the way back to Broadway’s “Golden Age.”  
Take, for example, this letter that legendary Broadway producer Herman Shulmin wrote to Bernard 
Grossman, former President of the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey & Connecticut 
and Chairman of the 1962 Symposium of the Committee on the Law of the Theatre:  
In my experience, the S.E.C. is nothing more than . . . red tape, delays, more delays, nuisance 
and cost.  And to what purpose?  Who is being protected and from what? Certainly, the honesty 
of the producer is not guaranteed by these official requirements . . . . 
As I understand the intention of Congress in passing the laws that created the S.E.C., it was to 
regulate the stock-selling activities which are so well-hidden in the devices of the public 
corporation.  But nothing of this is involved in the limited partnership form which is the usual 
manner of doing business in the theatre.  Moreover, and far more important, the amount of 
capital involved in the production of most plays is a tuppenny business, as against the vast 
amounts involved in the floating of stock corporations.  The production of plays is for the most 
part an intimate affair, carried on within a comparatively small family of people motivated in 
general by an interest in the theatre, rather than an interest in getting rich.  To equate the 
theatrical promotions with the debacle of Wall Street in 1929, from which the creation of the 
S.E.C. stems, is idiocy.  
When the thing began, a committee of lawyers whose interests were chiefly in theatre, got 
together and considered whether it should accept the subservience to the S.E.C.  They decided in 
favor of doing so.  That was a great error.  And now we are trapped in the years of precedence.  I 
would like to be the heroic producer who would refuse to submit, but now the warnings of the 
lawyers against such an action are very alarming. . . .  I wonder sometimes if it is not the essence 
of the legal character to look with joy upon the possibility of any process which promises more 
complexity, more red-tape, more paper work, rather than to strive for simplification?  Am I being 
cynical?  
Letter from Herman Shulmin to Bernard A. Grossman (Sept. 19, 1962), in FINANCING A THEATRICAL 
PRODUCTION 491 (Joseph Taubman ed., 1964). 
 127. Michael Paulson & David Gelles, ‘Hamilton’ Inc.: The Path to a Billion-Dollar Broadway 
Show, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 8, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2k7GaoQ. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Lorne Manly, ‘Rebecca’ Publicist Loses Round in Lawsuit Over Show’s Travails, N.Y. TIMES 
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 130. Michael Riedel, Spring on Broadway will be a bloodbath for new musicals, N.Y. POST (Mar. 
10, 2016), https://perma.cc/HK3K-UGEW.  
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leaving the lead producer unable to pay back creditors for funds already spent.131  
Each scandal of this kind increases the likelihood that Broadway investors and 
insiders agitate for regulatory change.132 
Still, as Broadway shows become more and more expensive to produce, lead 
producers are unlikely to stop recruiting co-producers to raise or contribute portions 
of their capitalizations.  So how can the industry avoid the drawbacks associated 
with this growing practice? 
Veteran Broadway producer David Stone (Wicked, Next to Normal, The 25th 
Annual Putnam County Spelling Bee) suggests that co-producers will be unwilling 
to ever register as brokers with the SEC.133  Registering as a broker-dealer is a 
complicated and expensive process that requires applicants to complete a test for 
membership demonstrating competence in securities activities and to pay annual 
membership fees.134  However, Mr. Stone advises lead producers to instruct their 
co-producing partners to refrain from conduct that might trigger registration 
requirements.  Most significantly, Broadway co-producers should (1) stop publicly 
soliciting investors, either through social media or via e-mail, and (2) avoid 
advising investors as to the value of the securities involved, specifically by making 
projections about a production’s financial prospects.  
In addition, lead producers should limit the aspects of the transaction in which 
co-producers can participate.  When adjudicating the broker-dealer test, some 
courts have considered whether the intermediary participated at “key points” in the 
transaction.135  An intermediary who negotiates the level of the investment, delivers 
offering papers, closes the deal, and/or transfers funds will be more likely to trigger 
registration requirements than a less involved intermediary.136  As such, after 
finding a potential investor, a co-producer should do no more than introduce that 
investor to the general partner or managing member of the production company.  
Finally, producers might consider alternative fundraising models to the 
dominant one described in this Note.  In 2015, for example, Corey Schwitz and 
Stephen Santore—two theater professionals who first worked together at the 
advertising agency SpotCo—founded Standing Room Capital, an online platform 
to invest in Broadway shows.137  Mr. Schwitz and Mr. Santore had the idea to start 
Standing Room Capital after the passing of the JOBS Act, which permits certain 
offerings to be solicited to the general public.  Membership in Standing Room 
Capital cost two hundred and fifty dollars and was open only to accredited 
investors.  After joining Standing Room Capital, members would be offered 
investment opportunities in Broadway productions and tours, at a minimum starting 
 
 131. Michael Riedel, Money scandals roils Broadway’s canceled ‘Nerds’, N.Y. POST (Mar. 25, 
2016), https://perma.cc/5EYQ-37VF.  
 132. Interview with John Pinckard, supra note 125.   
 133. Interview with David Stone, supra note 11. 
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unit of two thousand and five hundred dollars.  Standing Room Capital intended to 
bundle units from its member-investors and distribute profits proportionately.138  In 
consideration for creating and managing the fund, Mr. Schwitz and Mr. Santore—
who registered as brokers with the SEC—would take a twenty percent commission 
off the total profits before making returns to the investors.  Mr. Santore cites 
logistical hurdles to explain his platform’s eventual closure.139  The platform, 
however, offers a promising model for industry professionals hoping to circumvent 
the legal challenges associated with the current model of Broadway co-producing.  
As every Broadway aficionado knows, “the show must go on,” and money-
bundling Broadway co-producers have become essential players in raising the 
requisite capital to get a show from page to stage.  If Broadway co-producers were 
required to register as brokers with the SEC, these individuals might—to the 
detriment of the entire industry—pull out of the fundraising game entirely.  Still, 
with an increased awareness of federal fundraising requirements, the industry can 
self-regulate, to avoid the legal penalties of using unregistered intermediaries in the 
financing process. 
 
 
 138. Interview with Corey Schwitz, Co-Founder of Standing Room Capital and Student at 
Columbia Business School, in N.Y., N.Y. (Aug. 2, 2016). 
 139. A group of Standing Room Capital members collectively invested in the national tour of A 
Gentleman’s Guide to Love and Murder.  As such, the company is still in formal existence such that it 
can receive and make financial distributions.  However, the company no longer operates its online 
platform, and the co-founders never developed the company as initially planned.  Id. 
